

bellicose and expansionist are incorrect. Instead, he posits that China has a dualistic strategic culture, which includes two main elements. The first derives from the Confucian tradition, which is conflict-averse and defensive-minded. The second comes from a Realpolitik strand in Chinese history, which prefers the use of military force and is offense-oriented. Both of these two elements are active, Scobell points out, and they interact in a dialectic manner to produce a “Chinese Cult of Defense.” This cult of defense, Scobell contends

predisposes Chinese leaders paradoxically to engage in offensive military operations as a primary alternative in pursuit of national goals, while rationalizing these actions as being purely defensive and as a last resort. This dualistic strategic culture has been a constant, and China had not become more bellicose or dangerous in recent years except to the extent that its military capabilities have improved and military doctrine has changed (p. 15).

Scobell concludes that the “Chinese Cult of Defense,” together with changes in the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) doctrine and capabilities over the past two decades, indicates that Beijing’s twenty-first-century policymakers may employ military force more readily than their predecessors.

To illustrate his theoretical analysis, Scobell selects five cases from the history of the People’s Republic of China in the period 1950–96. Two cases are from the Mao period: China’s entry into the Korean War and the PLA’s intervention during the Cultural Revolution. Two cases are chosen from the Deng Xiaoping era: China’s border war with Vietnam in 1979 and the PLA’s role in the suppression of the student demonstrations in Beijing in 1989. The last case is from the Jiang Zemin years: the 1995–6 Taiwan Strait crisis.

Scobell breaks no new historical ground, which is not surprising for a political scientist, but he skillfully and effectively adduces historical facts to buttress his theoretical framework. His examination and explanation of China’s application of force is thought-provoking and highly revealing. While the writing is generally clear, the frequent insertion of subtitles sometimes disrupts the flow of the narrative, giving the book a disjointed feel.

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Vaclav SMIL, *China’s Past, China’s Future*. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. xv + 232 pp., with figures, tables, appendix. ISBN: 0-415-31499-2 (hc). Price: £70.00.

Enormous changes have taken place in China. Economic prosperity has resulted in a corresponding impact on the environment and accompanying

shifts in energy and food consumption. Vaclav Smil, who teaches at the University of Manitoba in Canada, is the world's leading authority on China's environment. In *China's Past, China's Future* Smil provides a combined retrospective of his early, pioneering work on China's biophysical foundations as well as updates and reassessments of his initial analyses and predictions. The author documents these changes in energy as well as in food and the environment to give an extremely accurate and progressive picture of how China is changing. For instance China has changed from a low energy consumer to an oil exporter to a net oil importer over a mere few decades.

Too many of the assessments from other authors are based on assumptions that are either pro- or anti-China. As a self-proclaimed longtime practitioner of the systems approach, Smil outlines the complications and implications of the rapidly growing and no less rapidly innovating energy industries in a factual and statistically based way. He tells us that oil security is now among the top concerns of China's energy planners. With the global rankings of first in potential for generating electricity from flowing water, third in verified coal reserves, and the fifth largest producer of oil, China only ranks twenty-third in proven natural gas reserves. There is a typical Chinese duality in energy. On the one hand, China's rural areas suffer extensive energy shortages even with its declining dependence on traditional fuels. On the other hand, China has seen a significant decline in overall energy/GDP intensity, which indicates not only a more efficient economy but also a declining burden on the environment. Nonetheless, China will overtake the United States to become the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases as early as 2010 or as late as 2025.

China will neither empty the world grain markets nor will it become a major grain exporter, according to the author after assessing China's past and future regarding food production and consumption. Smil devotes a fair portion of his food discussion to the 1959–61 famine of approximately 30 million deaths in China, the largest known famine in human history, a topic rarely discussed inside or outside of China. While he mentions the environmental factors in the famine, he leaves no doubt that the principle causes of the famine were political and lays the blame squarely at the feet of Mao Zedong. He credits the widespread household responsibility system (*baogan daohu*) for bringing unprecedented food availability. In short, Smil dispels the dramatic and cataclysmic myths of China's food crises, while laying bare the reasons for past and potential problems.

Although a reverence for nature runs unmistakably through China's long history, there has also been a clearly discernible current of destruction and

subjugation, according to the author. Smil outlines the widespread deforestation, intolerable air pollution, water contamination, loss of arable land, and decline of biodiversity, including a brief but excellent discussion of the South/North water transfer projects in China. He advocates subway construction, high-speed trains, and water-treatment plants. China's expanding population and huge developmental needs have put enormous demands on the environment. This is one of the most factual and comprehensive discussions on those environmental pressures currently available.

This book is for those who want to follow the progress of the environment, food, and energy in China as well as for those devoted to Smil's legacy in this field. The author illustrates by combining his past and current predictions that China's

fate, so fundamentally dependent on its supply of energy and food and on the maintenance of a healthy environment, will be determined more by the future choices and actions of its people than by either its ancient cultural heritage or its natural endowments and challenging environment.

This is an admirable discussion of China's past and current approaches to this vital set of issues.

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Susan M. WALCOTT, *Chinese Science and Technology Industrial Parks*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. x + 220 pp., with tables, figures, maps. ISBN: 0-7546-0952-9 (hc). Price: £55.00.

Rapid economic development has taken place in China since the late 1970s. Whether China can acquire advanced technology from advanced countries or develop its own indigenous technology are crucial challenges for China to become a global competitor. Chinese science and technology industrial parks (STIPs) have been established in China to foster technology transfer and technology development.

This book, written by Susan Walcott, a geographer at Georgia State University, is a study of high-tech parks in different regions in China. The author examined four questions. First, do China's STIPs represent a unique model with Chinese characteristics? Second, does each STIP present its own modifications within a regional or national superstructure? Third, what is the role of proximity for promoting learning within a STIP? Fourth, how do